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Does Corporate Law Protect the Interests of 
Shareholders and Other Stakeholders? 
The SEC's Suspension and 
Bar Powers in Perspective 
Jayne W. Barnard" 
Enron has brought about demands ffom many quarters to grant the Secunties and 
E¥change Commission (SEC) new powers. Among the powers the SEC now seeks is the power 
to bar or suspend securities law violators fiom serving as an officer or director of any public 
company. ClJITently, the law assigns this power only to federal district courts. In this Essay, 
Professor Barnard traces the history of the cUITent Jaw, examining Hily Congress has expressly 
withheld suspension and bar powers ffom the SEC. She then argues that the courts have 
exercised their suspension and bar powers wisely, and that recent developments do not compel 
any legislative change. Finally, recognizing that Congress may weD be persuaded that new 
legislation is necessary, she provides model statutory language that could be used for such a 
change. 
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Recently, the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) 
Director of the Division of Enforcement, Stephen M. Cutler, suggested 
that the Commission would soon be seeking legislative authority to bar 
those offenders found liable for securities laws violations from serving 
* James Goold Cutler Professor of Law, The College ofWilliam & Mary School of 
Law, Williamsburg, Vrrginia. Thanks to Doug Branson for creating the opportunity for me to 
express my views on this unfolding topic, to Jeremy Eglen and Craig Grider, who spent part 
of their spring break tracking down references for inclusion in the Essay and to the student 
editors of the Tulane Law Review for outstanding editorial work under significant time 
constraints. 
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as an officer or director of any public company.1 Cutler argued that the 
existing statutory scheme, which limits the authority to impose such a 
bar to federal judges in litigated proceedings, is inadequate.2 He 
further suggested that the case law currently governing bar orders has 
imposed an ''unreasonably high" standard of proof on the 
Commission.3 
I would like to suggest that the standard of proof for barring an 
offender from serving as an officer or director is high for several 
reasons, having to do with concerns that the SEC rarely considers. 
These concerns have to do with the right of citizens, even convicted 
felons, to seek work commensurate with their skills; the right of those 
who are found to have violated the law, even the securities laws, to be 
subject to punishment proportionate to their wrongdoing; the right of 
defendants in civil cases not to be subject to "punishmenf' at all; and 
the right of shareholders under applicable state law to defme the 
composition of the board that will represent their interests. 
Congress had these rights in mind when it enacted the existing 
statutory scheme governing bar orders.4 Congress had these rights in 
mind when it expressly declined to extend to the Commission the 
authority to enter such orders unilaterally. Congress anticipated 
correctly, in hindsight, that the Commission would overrely on the bar 
order rather than crafting more carefully tailored orders and would 
often seek to bar defendants for whom alternative remedies would be 
more appropriate. Thus, we should not be surprised that Congress 
reserved for the courts the power to enter bar orders and set a high 
threshold, "substantial unfitness;' for entering such orders. 
The federal courts have understood Congress's intentions in this 
area. In considering the SEC's requests for bar orders over the last 
decade, some federal courts have said "no" to the Commission's 
overreaching requests. These courts have recognized that many federal 
securities law offenders are unlikely to recidivate and that outside of a 
1. Stephen M. Cutler, Remarks at the Glasser LegaJWorks 20th Annual Federal 
Securities Institute, atwww.sec.gov/news/speechlspch538.htm (Feb. 15, 2002). 
2. Id 
3. ld 
4. The scheme may be found at 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2) (2000), which provides: 
In any proceeding under paragraph (1) of this subsection, the court may prohibit, 
conditionally or unconditionaUy, and permanently or for such period of time as it 
shaii determine, any person who violated section 78j(b) of this title or the rules or 
regulations thereunder from acting as an officer or director of any [public 
company] if the person's conduct demonstrates substantial unfitness to serve as an 
officer or director of any such issuer. 
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criminogenic milieu, many offenders can make significant 
contributions to legitimate businesses. In some cases, therefore, these 
courts have declined to enter any form of bar order, and in other cases 
they have imposed a more limited order (in terms of duration or scope) 
than that sought by the SEC. A thoughtful reading of these decisions 
reveals that they are based on a well-developed evidentiary record and 
a careful application of the relevant factors. 
Nevertheless, the SEC now argues that the courts have employed 
"a burdensome and overly restrictive test''5 in securities cases. As a 
result, the Connnission would now like to "improve" the existing 
statutory regime. It would like to seize from the courts the power to 
enter its own occupational bar orders against securities law offenders. 
It happily sees in the Enron debacle an opportunity to achieve this 
goal. 
This Essay argues that Congress should resist the SEC's efforts to 
expand its powers in this area.6 It goes on to suggest that, if Congress 
cannot resist the SEC's blandishments, then Congress should be 
careful to specify the circumstances under which (and the procedures 
by which) a suspension or bar order may legitimately be entered by the 
SEC. 
I. THE CURRENT STATUTORY REGIME 
The origins of the existing statutory scheme can be traced to the 
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (the 
Treadway Commission), which in 1987 recommended that "the SEC 
should seek explicit statutory authority to bar or suspend corporate 
officers and directors involved in fraudulent fmancial reporting from 
future service in that capacity in a public company."7 
The SEC embraced this recommendation, and in 1989, the 
Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 1989 (1989 bill) was 
5. Cutler, supranote 1. 
6. As this Essay is written, the Commission is also promoting a number of other 
enhancements to its authority, which are not addressed here. These enhancements include 
elimination of the scienter requirement under rule 1 Ob-5, the development of a powerful new 
corporate governance "self-regulatory organization" that would be overseen by the 
Commission, increased penalties, new definitions of insider trading, and possible revisions to 
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. See Jacob M. Schlesinger, O'Neill 
U~ighs Stricter Corporate Penalties, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2002, at A3. 
7. Jayne W. Barnard, The Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 1989: 
Disenfi:anchising Shareholders in Order to Protect Them, 65 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 32, 32 
(1989) (quoting Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 66 
(1987)). 
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introduced.8 Among other provisions, the 1989 bill provided that the 
SEC could, in administrative proceedings under section 15(c)(4) of the 
Exchange Act, enter an order against "any person found to have failed 
to comply, or to have been a cause of the failure to comply'' with the 
reporting requirements of the Act, barring or suspending them from 
serving as an officer or director of any public company.9 In addition, 
the 1989 bill sought express statutory authority to seek such orders in 
litigated proceedings. 
At the time, few critics challenged the notion that the SEC could 
seek a court-ordered removal of a corporate officer or director, or a 
corporation-specific suspension or bar, even without express statutory 
authority. Indeed, the SEC had often sought such court orders and 
embodied such orders in litigation settlements. 10 Moreover, in a few 
compelling cases, the SEC had sought more aggressive court orders, 
including orders that would either temporarily or permanently 
disqualify an offender from serving as an officer or director of any 
public company. These draconian orders (known as "comprehensive 
suspensions or bar orders") had also been embodied in litigation 
settlements.11 Thus, there was little objection to memorializing these 
practices in legislation. Critics did argue, however, that 
permitting the SEC, as opposed to the federal district courts, to compel 
removal or disqualification of corporate officers and directors-either in 
a corporation-specific context or with a comprehensive order-would 
grant the Commission unwarranted power and would distort its proper 
role in maintaining the integrity of the capital markets. 12 
Criticisms focused on the SEC's "adjudicatory competence, potential 
for abuse of discretion and the question of whether the suspension and 
bar power [would permit] the SEC to 'punish' individuals (which is 
constitutionally impermissible for a regulatory agency) or merely to 
regulate their conduct."13 
These criticisms were embraced by the Business Law Section of 
the American Bar Association, which vigorously opposed the 1989 
bill. As a result of the section's efforts, the bill was significantly 
amended. "The amended bill narrowed the suspension and bar 
provisions by deleting the SEC's authority to impose executive 
8. Id at33. 
9. Id at 34 (quoting H.R. 975, IOlst Cong. (1989)). 
10. Seeid 
11. Seeid 
12. Id 
13. Id at 35-36 (footnote omitted). 
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suspension or bar orders on its own and by limiting the bill's 
application in litigated matters to instances of 'scienter-based fraud."'14 
Thus, when the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny 
Stock Reform Act (Remedies Act) fmally became law in 1990, 
Congress had unequivocally rejected the initial scheme by which the 
SEC, as well as the federal courts, would have enjoyed suspension and 
bar authority. As it is now, the SEC has limited cease-and-desist 
authority's while the federal courts can employ a hierarchy of remedies 
that deal with both short-term and long-term remedial goals. 
In the first instance, courts can enter a number of types of 
injunctions, each requiring a distinctive and exacting standard of proof. 
The simplest form of injunctive relief is the disgorgement order, in 
which the defendant is required to disgorge her profits, sometimes 
accompanied by a civil penalty.16 Next in complexity is the 
misconduct-specific injunction, in which the defendant is ordered not 
to repeat the type of behavior that is the subject of the current 
proceeding.'' Next comes the more generalized, yet still topic-specific 
injunction, in which the defendant is ordered not to engage in any form 
of misconduct similar to that involved in the current proceeding.18 
Finally, and most ambitiously, comes the omnibus "obey-the-law" 
injunction, in which the defendant is prohibited from violating any 
portion of the federal securities laws, on pain of contempt and 
additional sanctions.'9 
14. Jayne W. Barnard, Men Is a Corporate Executive "Substantially Unfit to 
Serve"?, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1489, 1494 (1992). 
15. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3 (2000). 
16. See, e.g., SEC v. Palmisano, 135 F.3d 860, 863 (2d Cir. 1998) (upholding $9.2 
million disgorgement order plus a civil penalty of $500,000); SEC v. Chester Holdings, Ltd., 
41 F. Supp. 2d 505, 529-30 (D.N.J. 1999) (ordering disgorgement of$2, 106,185 but declining 
to order payment of a civil penalty); SEC v. Farrell, No. 95-CV-6133T, 1996 WL 788367, at 
*11 (W,D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 1996) (ordering disgorgement of $32,187.50 and payment of a civil 
penalty in an equivalent amount). 
17. See, e.g., SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 
(affirming an injunction against further violations of section 13(d)). 
18. See, e.g., SEC v. Poirier, 140 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1047 (D. Ariz. 2001) (enjoining 
the defendant from future violations of sections 17(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act of 1933, 
sections 7(t) and lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of1934, rule lOb-S promulgated under 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and regulation X); SEC v. Dimensional Entm't Corp., 
518 F. Supp. 773, 774 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (enjoining the defendant from violating sections 5(a), 
S(c), and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, and rules 1 O(b )-5 and 1 O(b )-6 thereunder). 
19. See, e.g., SEC v. Chester Holdings, Ltd., 41 F. Supp. 2d 505,530 (D.N.J. 1999) 
(entering an obey-the-law injunction); SEC v. Antar, 15 F. Supp. 2d 477, 533 (D.N.J. 1998) 
(entering on obey-the-law injunction against all defendants); SEC v. Falbo, 14 F. Supp. 2d 
508, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (entering an obey-the-law injunction against defendant Falbo). 
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All of these injunctions except the disgorgement injunction 
depend on the government's ability to demonstrate that, in the absence 
of an injunction, there is a reasonable likelihood of future violations. 20 
This requirement has been stringently applied to the SEC's (and other 
agencies') requests for injunctions.21 Some of the Commission's 
frustration in this area may derive from the fact that, even aside from 
its ability to seek suspension and bar orders, its efforts to secure broad 
injunctive relief have sometimes been rebuffed for lack of evidence. 22 
And it is important to note that misconduct-specific injunctions, 
more generalized injunctions, and "obey-the-law'' injunctions were 
already available to the SEC when the Remedies Act was passed. One 
could reasonably conclude, therefore, that the suspension and bar 
authority embodied in the Act was created to provide new tools where 
the existing tools had proven inadequate. 23 Stated another way, one 
could reasonably conclude that suspension and bar orders were 
intended for use only where the court was convinced that the other 
forms of injunctions would likely be insufficient. This would mean 
that the standard for imposing a suspension or bar order would 
necessarily be different-and higher-than the standard for imposing 
a garden-variety injunction. Specifically, suspension and bar orders 
would be entered only in cases of recidivism or truly egregious 
misconduct. This is the position that was taken by the SEC in 
20. SEC v. Monarch Fund, 608 F.2d 938, 943 (2d Cir. 1979); SEC v. Commonwealth 
Chern. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90,99-100 (2d Cir. 1978). 
21. See Daniel J. Morrissey, SEC Injunctions, 68 TENN. L. REv. 427,453-54, 456-58 
(2001) (tracing the history of SEC injunctions generally, and the history of the "likelihood of 
future violations" requirement specifically). 
22. See, e.g., SEC v. Pros Int'l, Inc., 994 F.2d 767,769 (lOth Cir. 1993) (upholding 
denial of injunction where there was ''no evidence that future violations are likely"); SEC v. 
Yun, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1294 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (denying the SEC's request for an 
injunction because future violations were unlikely as actions were isolated, conduct was not 
egregious, and participants regretted their involvement); SEC v. Enters. Solutions, Inc., 142 F. 
Supp. 2d 561, 579 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (refusing to enter an injunction against one of the 
defendants where the Commission failed to demonstrate that he was likely to commit further 
violations); SEC v. Globus Group, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1347 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (refusing 
to enter injunction where SEC action was based on "isolated, as opposed to recurrent, 
violations of the securities laws"); Falbo, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 529 (enjoining one defendant but 
declining to enjoin the other where the Commission failed to demonstrate as to the second 
that it was reasonably likely that he would commit future violations). One commentator has 
opined that courts in recent years have become increasingly stringent in their requirements for 
injunctions in SEC cases. See David Franklin Levy, Comment, The Impact of the Remedies 
Act on the SECsAbility to Obtain Injunctive Relief, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 645, 655-71 (1994 ). 
23. "The Senate report [accompanying the Remedies Act] indicates that the purpose 
of Pub. L. No. 101-429 was to 'provide the agency with a broader range of remedies to 
protect investors and maintain the integrity of the nation's security markets."' United States v. 
Merriam, 108 F.3d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting S. REP. No. 101-337 (1990)). 
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describing how it intended to use its new remedial tool. 24 It is also the 
position most federal courts have taken in applying the Remedies Act. 
II. THE COURTS' APPROACH TO THE STATUTE AS WRITTEN 
Courts are empowered to enter a suspension or bar order when 
the government is able to demonstrate the defendant's "substantial 
unfitness to serve." There was little useful legislative history to this 
important phrase. Courts, however, have consistently employed a six-
part test in determining whether such an order is appropriate. 
The test derives from a law review article published in 1992.25 
The first court to construe the statute adapted the proposal contained in 
that article and considered the following six factors in deciding 
whether to make a "substantial unfitness" fmding: "(1) the 
'egregiousness' of the underlying securities law violation; (2) the 
defendant's 'repeat offender' status; (3) the defendant's 'role' or 
position when he engaged in the fraud; ( 4) the defendant's degree of 
scienter; ( 5) the defendant's economic stake in the violation; and 
( 6) the likelihood that misconduct will recur."26 
The most significant and thoughtful articulation of the six-part 
test emerged two years later from the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit in SEC v. Patel21 While the court recognized 
the six-part test as ''useful in making the unfitness assessment;' it went 
on to caution that 
[w]e do not mean to say that [the six factors] are the only factors that 
may be taken into account or even that it is necessary to apply all these 
factors in every case. A district court should be afforded substantial 
24. See Barnard, supra note 14, at 1510 ("In lobbying for the Remedies Act, both 
SEC Chairman Richard Breeden and his predecessor, David Ruder, assured Congress that the 
Commission would seek executive suspension and bar orders only in cases of 'egregious' 
misconduct or of repeated violations of the securities laws!'). 
25. Id 
26. SEC v. Shah, No. 92CIV1952, 1993 WL 288285, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 1993). 
This formulation is very similar to the test employed by the SEC when deciding whether to 
suspend or bar a broker or other fmancial professional in administrative proceedings before 
the Commission. When the Commission determines administrative sanctions, it considers 
the egregiousness of the defendant's actions, the isolated or recurrent nature of the 
infraction, the degree of scienter involved, the sincerity of the defendant's 
assurances against future violations, the defendant's recognition of the wrongful 
nature of his conduct, and the likelihood that the defendant's occupation will 
present opportunities for future violations. 
In re Fundamental Portfolio Advisors, Inc., Initial Decision, Release No. ID-180, 2001 WL 
66344, at *21 (Jan. 29, 2001) (quoting Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126, 1140 (5th Cir. 
1979), aff(J, 450 u.s. 91 (1981 )). 
27. 61 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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discretion in deciding whether to impose a bar to employment in a 
bl. 28 pu 1c company. 
The six-part test for determining whether to enter a suspension or 
bar order has now been embraced by every court to have considered 
the matter. The test is similar to the test employed to deteiilline 
whether other forms of injunctive relief should be ordered in securities 
cases, especially in its emphasis on the government's need to prove the 
likelihood of future misconduct. 29 As the court in Patel correctly 
observed, the likelihood of future misconduct is "always an important 
element in deciding whether [to order] a lifetime ban."30 And, as it has 
done in cases involving other types of injunctive relief,31 the Second 
Circuit was careful to note that, in the absence of a record of 
recidivism or defiance of previous injunctive orders against the 
defendant, the district court must "articulate the factual basis for a 
finding of the likelihood of recurrence."32 This is often a hard case to 
make, as the science of predicting white-collar recidivism is inexact, at 
bese3 Nonetheless, the Commission has consistently been successful 
in making that case, as the decisions in the following Part attest. 
A. The Commissions Success!iJJ Application of the Statute to 
Deserving Defendants 
Since its passage in 1990, the Remedies Act suspension and bar 
provision has been invoked successfully on many occasions. An early 
decision in the Second Circuit, for example, affmned comprehensive 
bar orders against the legendary scoffiaw Victor Posner and his son, 
upholding the district court's fmding that the defendants had 
"committed securities law violations with a 'high degree of scienter' 
and that their past securities law violations and lack of assurances 
against future violations demonstrated that such violations were likely 
to continue."34 fu SEC v, First Pacific Banco1p, the United States 
28. Id at 141. 
29. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
30. 61 E3d at 141. 
31. See, e.g., United States v. Carson, 52 E3d 1173, 1184 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting the 
distinction between cases involving "systematic wrongdoing'' and those involving an 
"isolated occurrence" in determining whether an injunction against future labor racketeering 
would be appropriate). 
32. 61 E3d at 142. 
33. See Barnard, supra note 14, at 1517-19 nn.152-161 (summarizing the social-
science literature regarding white-collar recidivism). 
34. SEC v. Posner, 16 E3d 520, 521-22 (2d Cir. 1994). Based on its review of the 
Posners' "long and notorious history of engaging in self-dealing and corporate waste to the 
detriment of the public shareholders of companies under their control," the district court 
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Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit similarly a:ffmned a 
comprehensive bar order where the defendant Sands, the chairman of 
the board, CEO, and corporate counsel of a bank holding company, 
had orchestrated a complex scheme that had brought down a federally 
insured bank with a loss of $688,000 to investors.35 
These two cases represent· the two most compelling scenarios for 
the imposition of a comprehensive bar order, the recidivist (Posner) 
and the big-time defrauder (Sands). They each are excellent templates. 
A more recent case, SEC v. Farrell,36 shows yet another successful 
use of the suspension and bar statute. In Farrell, the defendant had 
engaged in insider trading activities while serving on the board of a 
publicly owned bank.37 The defendant was prosecuted criminally and 
incarcerated.3~ The Commission then sought both an injunction 
prohibiting further violations of Rule 1 Ob-5 and also a comprehensive 
bar order.39 The former was granted; the latter denied, at least in part. 
The court, recognizing the flexibility embodied in the statute, stated: 
Based upon the record, a permanent officer or director bar is not 
appropriate. Farrell's securities violations were serious and he did 
engage in fraudulent conduct in the hopes that his illegal activities 
would not be discovered. However, upon release from prison, he should 
not be barred from holding any other officer or director positions. 
Farrell is a talented executive and a permanent bar would effectively 
prevent him from using those talents to rebuild his life. However, in 
Jtiew of Farrens offense~ he is permanenCy barred ffom holding an 
officer/director position with any banking or financial institutions.40 
concluded that "one would be hard-pressed to fmd more worthy candidates to be barred from 
serving as officers and directors." SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., 837 F. Supp. 587, 
603, 614-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
35. 142 F.3d 1186, 1188-89 (9th Cir. 1998). The lower court in this case found that 
the defendant had 
caused the collapse of a federally insured bank; he attempted to stymie banking 
regulators from doing their jobs; he is a recidivist; and the fraudulent conduct he 
committed occurred while serving in a corporate or fiduciary capacity. The district 
court also found that Sands had a high level of scienter, that he engaged in ongoing 
and recurrent violations, that he had failed to assume any responsibility for his 
violations of law, that he utterly failed to recognize the wrongful nature of his 
conduct, and that there was a strong likelihood of future violations. 
Id at 1193-94 (quotations omitted). 
36. No. 95-CV-6133T, 1996 WL 788367 (w.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 1996). 
37. Id at *1-*3. 
38. /dat *4. 
39. Id 
40. Id at *8 (citation omitted and second emphasis added). 
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This decision illustrates that, even within the suspension and bar 
provision, there is a hierarchy of options available to the courts. One 
might describe the range of options as follows, with the least invasive 
type of injunction listed at the bottom of the chart and the most 
invasive type listed at the top. The result in the Farrell case is 
highlighted, indicating that the order in that case was a significant and 
meaningful one. 
A permanent comprehensive bar order 
A limited-term comprehensive suspension order 
A permanent functional bar A permanent industry-wide bar order 
order (e.g., the offender may {e.g., the offender may not serve as an 
not serve as the chief officer or director of any public company 
financial officer of any in the fmancial services industry) 
public company) 
A limited-term functional A limited-term industry-wide suspension 
suspension order order 
A permanent corporation-specific bar order 
A limited-term corporation-specific suspension order 
Another successful case, resulting in the entry of an order at an 
even higher level of invasiveness than Farrell is SEC v. McCaskey.41 In 
that case, the defendant was engaged in market manipulation. He 
ultimately pleaded guilty to one count of securities fraud and was 
sentenced to five years probation, a $30,000 fme, and a $100,000 
special assessmene2 In the SEC civil enforcement action that 
followed, the Commission sought a disgorgement order, civil monetary 
penalties, and both an injunction against future statutory violations and 
a comprehensive bar order.43 In its opinion, the district court found that 
the issues of disgorgement and monetary penalties were not ripe for 
decision on a motion for summary judgment, but entered an irljunction 
against future violations of the securities laws.44 Reviewing the 
defendant's behavior and current circumstances, the court also 
concluded that McCaskey was substantially unfit to serve as an officer 
41. No. 98CIV6153, 2001 WL 1029053 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2001). 
42. Id at*l. 
43. Id at *5-*7. 
44. Id 
2002] THE SEC'S SUSPENSION AND BAR POWERS 1263 
or director.45 It therefore suspended him from serving as an officer or 
director of any public company for a period of six years.46 
Two additional cases may be cited in which, unlike in Farrell and 
McCaskey, the SEC got everything it asked for. In SEC v. Soflpoin~ 
Inc., the Commission sought a permanent bar order against the chief 
operating officer of a publicly held company who had orchestrated a 
series of securities laws violations including earnings manipulation, 
the sale of unregistered stock, and the filing of numerous misleading 
10-Ks, 10-Qs, and registration statements.47 Even though the 
defendant was a frrst-time offender, the court had no difficulty 
entering an injunction permanently enjoining him from future 
violations of the securities laws and also permanently barring him 
from serving as an officer or director of a public company.48 
In SEC v. Zublds, the Commission sought a permanent bar order 
against an executive who had presided over a ''boiler room" operation, 
through which dozens of investors purchased worthless, unregistered 
securities.49 Noting that "Mr. Zubkis violated several federal securities 
laws and did so with scienter [and that he] did not commit an isolated 
infraction, but instead committed numerous violations over the course 
of several years;'50 the court here, too, found no difficulty in entering a 
permanent bar order. 51 
In addition to these reported cases, the SEC has been successful 
in a number of unreported cases52 and has repeatedly been able to settle 
45. Id at *7. 
46. Id 
47. 958 E Supp. 846, 851, 866-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff(f, 159 E3d 1348 (2d Cir. 
1998). 
48. Id at 866-67. The defendant was also ordered to disgorge $474,416 plus 
prejudgment interest of$61,155; in addition, he was assessed a $100,000 civil penalty. Id at 
867-68; see also SEC v. Chester Holdings, Ltd., 41 F. Supp. 2d 505, 531 (D.N.J. 1999) 
(entering a comprehensive bar order). 
49. No. 97CIV8086, 2000 WL218393, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2000). 
50. ld at *10. 
51. The court found: 
Over a period of several years, Mr. Zubkis, as head ofZ3, knowingly orchestrated a 
securities fraud that netted several million dollars and from which he stood to 
profit personally. The misrepresentations in this case were egregious. This is, 
moreover, not the first time that Mr. Zubkis has been found in violation of 
securities-related rules. 
ld at *11. 
52. See, e.g., SEC v. Hollywood Trenz, Inc., Accounting and Auditing Enforcement 
Act Release No. 17204, 76 SEC Docket 335 (Oct. 25, 2001) (reporting disposition of a civil 
enforcement action in which the United States District Court for the District of Columbia had 
entered a permanent bar order against the defendant); In re Silver, Exchange Act Release No. 
34-38914, 65 SEC Docket 372 (Aug. 11, 1997) (reporting that, in a prior civil action, the 
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many of its litigated cases with consent decrees in which suspension or 
bar orders played a prominent role. 53 This success in the settled cases 
may be due to the SEC's talent for driving a hard bargain. 54 It is at least 
as likely that these cases were settled, and suspension or bar orders 
were consented to, because the defendants were deserving of those 
sanctions and the reported cases suggested to their lawyers that if they 
resisted the terms presented, the bar would have been imposed by a 
court. Either way, in assessing the utility of the current statutory 
scheme, it is as important to look at the settled cases as the decided 
ones, virtually all of which have been favorable to the SEC. 
B. The Defendants J:vho ""Got Away' 
The SEC's Mr. Cutler suggests that the successful prosecutions 
described in the foregoing Part are the exceptions. He complains that, 
"when it comes to 0 and D bars, the courts have simply lost their 
way."55 He points to the Farrell and McCaskey cases as examples of 
United States District Court for the Central District of California had entered a permanent bar 
order against the defendant). 
53. See, e.g., SEC v. Barber, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act Release No. 
17314,2002 WL 54148, at *1 (Jan. 15, 2002) (permanently barring former CFO from acting 
as an officer or director of any public company); SEC v. Caserta, Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Act Release No. 17115, 75 SEC Docket 1772 (Sept. 5, 2001) (permanently 
barring a former CEO and CFO); SEC v. Itex Corp., Accounting and Auditing Enforcement 
Act Release No. 16841, 73 SEC Docket 3194 (Dec. 26, 2000) (permanently barring former 
CEO who agreed to disgorge $1.4 million); SEC v. Itex Corp., Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Act Release No. 16708, 73 SEC Docket 859 (Sept. 18, 2000) (permanently 
barring defendant Neal who agreed to disgorge $2,300,000 and pay a $200,000 civil penalty); 
SEC v. Mitchellette, SEC Release No. 16553, 72 SEC Docket 1102 (May 15, 2000) 
(permanently barring the company's founder); SEC v. Buchanan, Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Act Release No. 16518, 72 SEC Docket 596 (Apr. 18, 2000) (permanently 
barring the defendant); SEC v. Strauss, SEC Release No. 16360,71 SEC Docket 216 (Nov. 
17, 1999) (permanently barring the defendant); SEC v. United Fire Technology, Inc., SEC 
Release No. 16271, 70 SEC Docket 1191 (Sept. 2, 1999) (permanently barring defendant 
Kamerling who agreed to disgorge $1,066,515); SEC v. Drabinsky, SEC Release No. 16022, 
1999 WL 10253, at *1 (Jan. 13, 1999) (permanently barring the defendant Eckstein); SEC v. 
DiMauro, SEC Release No. 16017, 1999 WL 3456, at *1 (Jan. 7, 1999) (suspending the 
defendant DiLorenzo for ten years); SEC v. DiMauro, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement 
Act Release No. 15874, 67 SEC Docket 2171 (Sept. 9, 1998) (permanently barring the 
defendant Di Mauro); SEC v. Safronchik, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act Release 
No. 15833, 67 SEC Docket 1651 (Aug. 5, 1998) (permanently barring the defendant); SEC v. 
Peltz, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act Release No. 15657, 66 SEC Docket 1343 
(Mar. 3, 1998) (permanently barring the defendant); SEC v. Kilgore, SEC Release No. 15345, 
64 SEC Docket 1107 (Apr. 23, 1997) (permanently barring the defendant). 
54. See Mitchell E. Herr, Does the SEC Demand More in Settlement Than It Can Get 
at Trial?, Sec. Reg. L. Rep. (CCH) 607 (Apr. 23, 2001) (noting a "pervasive pattern in which 
the SEC seeks harsher sanctions in settlement than it is likely to get at trial''). 
55. Cutler, supranote 1. 
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the courts' unwarranted generosity in this area. ·He also cites the 
decision in the Patel case,56 which, upon close reading, hardly seems to 
be shocking. But even if one believes Patel was incorrectly decided, 
one arguably questionable decision does not represent a system that is 
broken and needs fiXing. 
Patel, like the Farrell case, involved insider trading by the 
defendane7 Not only had the defendant engaged in securities fraud, he 
had done so with knowledge that the company's stock price had been 
artificially inflated based on false documentation he had submitted to 
the Food and Drug Administration. 58 At the end of the day, he pleaded 
guilty to conspiracy to defraud the FDA, though he was not prosecuted 
criminally for the insider trading.59 He had, however, settled a 
securities fraud class action claim with a payment (in stock) valued at 
$3 million.lo In the civil enforcement proceeding brought against him 
by the SEC, Patel "conceded that he had violated the antifraud 
provisions and agreed that a permanent injunction against future 
violations would be appropriate.',61 However, he resisted imposition of 
a bar on his service as an officer or director of any public company.62 
The district court ruled against him. 63 
On appeal, the court reviewed with some care the fmdings below 
under the six-part test: 
Applying the factors suggested by Professor Barnard, the district 
court found: that Patel's violations were not egregious in comparison 
with those of others and in view of the size of the loss avoided; that 
Patel was a first-time offender; that in his position as officer and 
director of Par, Patel allowed the false Application to be submitted and 
obstructed the FDA investigation of the Application by providing a 
"switched sample" ofMaxzide to an FDA inspector; that Patel "showed 
some scienter in his actions, although he did not engage in clandestine 
trading"; that he was the sole economic beneficiary of his insider 
trading; and that, because he was a founder of Par and abused his 
position as officer and director, "the likelihood of future misconduct is 
sufficient to warrant the imposition of the injunctive relief requested."64 
56. SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 1995). 
57. Jd at 138. 
58. Jd 
59. Jd at 139. 
60. Jd 
61. Jd 
62. Jd 
63. Jd 
64. Jd at 141. 
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The court then focused on the record regarding the defendant's 
likelihood of future misconduct: 
The only findings that the district court made in this regard were that 
"Patel was a founder of Par and used his position as an officer and 
director to engage in misconduct." This is merely a general statement 
of events and can in no way justify the prediction that future 
misconduct will occur. 65 
Finally, the court took note of the hierarchical nature of the 
suspension and bar provision and the possibility that some form of 
suspension order short of a lifetime bar might be appropriate: 
[T]he governing statute provides that a bar on service as an officer or 
director that is based on substantial unfitness may be imposed 
"conditionally or unconditionally'' and "permanently or for such period 
of time as [the court] shall determine." We take these provisions to 
suggest that, before imposing a permanent bar, the court should 
consider whether a conditional bar (e.g., a bar limited to a particular 
industry) and/or a bar limited in time (e.g., a bar of five years) might be 
sufficient, especially where there is no prior history of unfitness .... If 
the district court decides that a conditional ban or a ban limited in time 
is not warranted, it should give reasons why a lifetime injunction is 
. d 66 nnpose . 
The case was then remanded. 67 The defendant's lawyer reports 
that the case was settled soon thereafter, with the defendant agreeing to 
pay less than originally ordered, in exchange for the imposition of a 
lifetime bar. 68 
Only one other published opinion could possibly support the 
Commission's desire for a change in the suspension and bar statute. 
That case, SEC v. Shah, is the only published opinion in which a 
federal court has denied in its entirety the Commission's request for a 
suspension or bar order. 69 (It was also the very first case in which the 
"substantial unfitness" language was construed by a court.) 
Shah involved the former president of a generic drug company 
who was involved in a scheme to bribe FDA examiners in order to get 
the company's products approved for distribution. 70 During the period 
when the company was paying the "illegal gratuities," the defendant 
65. Id 
66. Id at 142 (alteration in original). 
67. Id 
68. E-mail from Michael J. Resko to Jayne W. Bernard, Apr. 4, 2002 (on file with 
author). 
69. No.92CIV1952, 1993 WL 288285, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 1993). 
70. Id 
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was selling his stock.71 After the story broke, the defendant was 
prosecuted criminally for paying the gratuities but not for insider 
trading.72 He pled guilty. He settled a private civil action for $35,000, 
agreed to testify against two of his codefendants, and then was sued by 
the SEC in an enforcement action in which the Commission sought a 
comprehensive bar. 73 
After ordering a disgorgement of $119,053 (plus prejudgment 
interest), the court declined to enter the requested bar order.74 The 
court noted that "the loss ... avoided through [the defendant's] illegal 
sales . . . is relatively small. Thus, his violation of the securities laws 
should not be considered 'egregious."'75 In addition, the court found 
that Shah was a first-time offender, that his degree of scienter was "not 
... very high;' and that the "likelihood of future misconduct appears 
relatively slight."76 On the basis of these fmdings-and especially in 
light of the collateral penalties already imposed on the defendant-the 
court denied the SEC's request for a bar order.77 The SEC did not 
appeal the Shah decision. 
Thus, it would seem that the SEC's dissatisfaction with the state 
of the law governing suspensions and bars rests largely on the decision 
in SEC v. Shah, which it declined to appeal, and the thoughtful 
approach to the statute evidenced by the court of appeals in United 
States v. Patel, a case which the Commission ultimately won. 
In every other reported decision, and in unreported ones as well, 
the SEC has been successful in its efforts to secure meaningful 
remedies. It is thus difficult to see anything in this record justifying 
the Commission's current anxiety over the Remedies Act. 
ill. THE REAL MOTIVATION BEHIND THE REFORM lNITIATivE: ''EASY 
STREET" 
One might suggest that it is Enron opportunism, rather than a 
principled disagreement with Congress or the courts, that is driving the 
Commission's current legislative agenda. It is understandable, 
however, that the Commission would prefer to have unilateral power to 
suspend or bar offenders, rather than waiting for (and in some respects 
71. Id 
72. Id at *2. 
73. Id 
74. /dat *7. 
75. Id (citations omitted). 
76. Id 
77. Id 
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paying for) the federal courts to do so. Certainly, it would be more 
efficient to assign this power to an administrative process than to a 
judicial process. 
In addition, federal courts over the last decade have repeatedly 
legitimated bar orders entered by administrative agencies. In response 
to claims that such orders represent "punishment,'' for example, with 
implications under the Double Jeopardy Clause, courts have 
consistently held that occupational bars are not "punitive" but merely 
"remedial" in nature.78 Courts have rejected claims that administrative 
agencies ought not to impose a lifelong bar unless they can show that it 
is the least restrictive means of protecting the public.79 Courts have 
limited the due process rights of persons facing a summary debarment 
order from an administrative agency. so 
In other words, the federal courts have seldom rejected or 
reversed bar orders entered by administrative agencies. There are 
several other very practical reasons, though, why the SEC is eager to 
add suspension and bar powers to its existing cease-and-desist powers. 
In a nutshell, those reasons are (1) a lower standard of proof than 
required in court proceedings; (2) simplified procedures; (3) less 
onerous evidentiary requirements; ( 4) no requirement to show a 
reasonable likelihood of future misconduct; and ( 5) a sense of greater 
influence and control over the process. The recent Commission 
decisions involving KPMG Peat Marwick LLP illustrate the appeal of 
unilateral action as compared to the more burdensome process of 
seeking injunctive reliee1 
78. Se~ e.g., Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 117 (1997) (holding that an 
administrative debarment of banking officials does not constitute punishment); Cox v. 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 138 F.3d 268, 272-74 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that an 
administrative sanction barring a commodities trader from trading in the commodities 
markets for life does not constitute punishment); United States v. Merriam, 108 F.3d 1162, 
1165 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that a disciplinary sanction barring a brokerage f'rrm employee 
from associating with any NASD member for life does not constitute punishment); United 
States v. Hatfield, 108 F.3d 67, 69 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that a twenty-six-month debarment 
of a federal contractor does not constitute punishment); United States v. Boijesson, 92 F.3d 
954, 956 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that indef'mite debarment from participating in HUD-
sponsored programs does not constitute punishment). At least one critic has challenged cases 
such as these, arguing that the permanent deprivation of one's livelihood is surely punitive. 
See Susan R Klein, Redrawing the Criminal-Civil Boundary, 2 BUFF. CRIM:. L. REv. 679 
(1999). 
79. Rizek v. SEC, 215 F.3d 157, 161 (1st Cir. 2000). 
80. FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230 (1988) (holding that a banking officer charged 
with a felony involving dishonesty may be suspended from his position summarily, and may 
not be entitled to a ''prompt" postsuspension hearing). 
81. In re KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 43862, 74 SEC 
Docket 357 (Jan. 19, 2001) (holding that negligence, rather than scienter, will suftice to 
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PROVISION OUGHT TO INCLUDE 
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While it certainly seems unnecessary to change the current 
statutory scheme, and perhaps unwise in view of the Commission's 
obvious desire to employ the suspension and bar sanction far more 
broadly than would be permitted in the federal courts, it is fair to 
consider just what an administrative suspension and bar provision 
might include. We can begin with analogies. 
A number of federal statutes currently provide for "debarment'' 
of one type or another.82 Some of these statutes, like the current 
Remedies Act provision, require a judicial determination that 
debarment is appropriate, 83 while others permit the determination to be 
made unilaterally by the federal agency involved. Some of the 
debarment provisions are categorical and therefore predictable, such as 
those that prohibit a person convicted of certain felonies from doing 
business with the federal government.84 Other provisions require an 
exercise of discretion. Of the latter group, some provisions are quite 
detailed in setting out the issues to be considered prior to entering a 
support a cease-and-desist order; that the showing required for a cease-and-desist order is 
"significantly less than that required for an injunction;" that only "some risk'' of a future 
violation is necessary to support a cease-and-desist order; and that ordinarily the existence of 
a past violation will suffice to satisfY the "some risk" test); In re KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, 
Exchange Act Release No. 44050, 2001 WL 223378, at *6 (Mar. 8, 2001) (reiterating that the 
risk of future violations sufficient to support a cease-and-desist order is "significantly less 
than that required for an injunction"); see also Morrissey, supra note 21, at 467-70 
(comparing the ease with which the SEC may pursue a cease-and-desist order, with the effort 
involved in seeking an injunction). 
82. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(l) (2000) (permitting debarment of a banking 
official where she has "engaged or participated in any unsafe or unsound [banking] practice" 
from which ''the insured depository institution's depositors have been or could be prejudiced" 
and which "demonstrates willful or continuing disregard by such party for the safety or 
soundness [of the banking system]"); 21 U.S.C. § 335a(b) (2000) (permitting debarment of a 
person convicted of certain crimes where she has "demonstrated a pattern of conduct 
sufticient to fmd that there is reason to believe that [she] may violate requirements under this 
chapter relating to drug products"). 
83. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § SOa-35 (2000) (authorizing district courts to suspend or bar 
an ofticer, director, or member of any advisory board of an investment company where the 
court finds that he has engaged in a practice constituting a breach of fiduciary duty involving 
personal misconduct); 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (1994) (authorizing district courts to remove a 
pension plan official where the court fmds that he has breached any of the responsibilities, 
obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by [ERISA]). 
84. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 8902a(b)(I) (2000) (foreclosing health care providers 
"convicted . . . of a criminal offense relating to fraud, corruption, breach of fiduciary 
responsibility, or other fmancial misconduct in connection with the delivery of a health care 
service" from participation in the Medicare program); 21 U.S.C. § 335a(a) (foreclosing 
individuals convicted of an FDA-related felony from seeking approval for a generic drug 
product). 
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suspension or bar order, ss while others are more amorphous. 86 Some of 
the bar provisions set a statutory limit on the number of years for 
which an offender can be taken out of circulation, 87 and others provide 
quite a detailed procedure for terminating the debarment or lifting the 
bar.ss 
What all this means, simply, is that (1) Congress knew what it 
was doing when it assigned the decision-making role to the federal 
district courts rather than the Commission and required a fmding of 
"substantial unfitness;' and (2) Congress has a number of models to 
choose from should it choose to indulge the Commission's request for 
a change in the current statute. 
Some of the statutes would make poor models for reform, 
though, insofar as they give virtually unbounded discretion to the 
agency empowered to enter a suspension and bar order unilaterally.~Q 
At least three statutes, however, would seem to provide useful models 
for drafting an SEC suspension and bar statute. The first is the statute 
governing debarment of investment company executives.90 The second 
85. See, e.g., 5 U.S. C. § 8902a(f) (requiring a decision on whether to bar a health care 
provider to "take into account--(1) the nature of any claims involved and the circumstances 
under which they were presented; (2) the degree of culpability, history of prior offenses or 
improper conduct of the provider involved; and (3) such other matters as justice may 
require"). 
86. See, e.g., 15 U.S. C. § 80a-35 (permitting debarment of a person who has engaged 
or was about to engage in any act or practice constituting a breach of fiduciary duty involving 
personal misconduct, and such injunctive or other relief "as may be reasonable and 
appropriate in the circumstances, having due regard to the protection of investors and to the 
effectuation of the policies declared in section 80(a)-l(b) of this title"). 
87. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 504 (1994) (establishing that the conviction for robbery, 
bribery, extortion, embezzlement, grand larceny, burglary, arson, violation of narcotics laws, 
or violent crimes bars the offender from serving as an officer, director, trustee, member of 
any executive board, business manager, or representative of any labor organization for at least 
three but no more than thirteen years); Id § 1111 (establishing that the conviction for 
enumerated crimes bars the offender from serving as an administrator, fiduciary, officer, 
trustee, custodian, counsel, agent, employee, or representative of any employee benefit plan 
for at least three but no more than thirteen years); 33 U.S.C. § 569f(1994) (establishing that 
the conviction for intentionally afiiXing a label bearing a ''Made in America" inscription to a 
product that is not made in the United States and is used in a civil works project requires 
debarment for at least three but no more than five years). 
88. See, e.g., 5 U.S. C.§ 8902a(g)(4) (permitting a barred health care provider to apply 
for reinstatement after the passage of three years, if he can provide "reasonable assurances 
that the types of action which formed the basis for the original debarment have not recurred 
and will not recur''). 
89. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1818(g)(l) (2000) (permitting federal bank regulatory 
agencies to remove summarily bank officials charged with certain crimes "if continued 
service or participation by such party may pose a threat to the interests of the depository 
institution's depositors or may threaten to impair public confidence in the depository 
institution"). 
90. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9 (2000). 
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is the statute governing debarment of investment advisers.91 The third 
is the statute governing debarment of brokers and dealers.92 All three 
of these statutes contain specific and detailed language governing the 
circumstances under which a suspension or bar may be ordered by the 
SEC and accordingly require specific factual fmdings to be made.93 
The investment company provision also lays out a procedure by which 
a person subject to a bar order may seek an exemption if that order 
would be "unduly or disproportionately severe or [if] the conduct of 
such person has been such as not to make it against the public interest 
or protection of investors to grant such application."94 
Drawing on these examples, a reasonable provision for the SEC 
might look something like this: 
(a) The Commission may, after notice and opportunity for 
hearing, by order prohibit, conditionally or unconditionally, either 
permanently or for such period of time as it in its discretion shall 
91. Jd § SOb-3. 
92. Jd § 78c(b). 
93. For example, in 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9(b), an investment company executive may be 
debarred where: 
( 1) [He or she] has willfully made or caused to be made in any registration 
statement, application or report filed with the Commission under this subchapter 
any statement which was at the time and in the light of the circumstances under 
which it was made false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or has 
omitted to state in any such registration statement, application, or report any 
material fact which was required to be stated therein; 
(2) [He or she] has willfully violated any provision of the Securities Act of 
1933, or of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or of subchapter II of this chapter, 
or of this subchapter, or of the Commodity Exchange Act, or of any rule or 
regulation under any of such statutes; 
(3) [He or she] has willfully aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, 
induced, or procured the violation by any other person of the Securities Act of 
1933, or of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or of subchapter II of this chapter, 
or of this subchapter, or of the Commodity Exchange Act, or of any rule or 
regulation under any of such statutes; 
(4) [He or she] has been found by a foreign lmancial regulatory authority 
to have [engaged in similar practices]; 
(5) [W]ithin ten years [he or she] has been convicted by a foreign court of 
competent jurisdiction of a crime, however denominated by the laws of the relevant 
foreign government, that is substantially equivalent to an offense set forth in 
paragraph (1) of subsection (a) ... ; or 
(6) [B]y reason of any misconduct, [he or she] is temporarily or 
permanently enjoined by any foreign court of competent jurisdiction from acting in 
any of the capacities, set forth in paragraph (2) of subsection (a) ... , or a 
substantially equivalent foreign capacity, or from engaging in or continuing any 
conduct or practice in connection with any such activity or in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security. 
Jd § 80a-9(b) (citations omitted). 
94. Jd § 80a-9(c). 
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deem appropriate in the public interest, any person from serving 
or acting as an officer or director of any public company, if: 
(1) the Commission fmds that, in the absence of such an 
order, the person is reasonably likely to continue to violate 
the federal securities laws and 
(2) the Commission fmds that such person is substantially 
unfit to serve in such a position, either permanently or 
temporarily. 
(b) The fmdings required in section (a) shall be made based on 
clear and convincing evidence. 
(c) The Commission shall, in considering such an order, 
determine that any such order is the least restrictive means of 
preventing harm to the public. 
(d) The Commission shall by regulation develop a process by 
which any such order may be terminated or modified on motion 
of the defendant after eight years, where the defendant can 
(1) demonstrate that the types of behavior that formed the 
basis for the original debarment or suspension have not 
recurred and 
(2) provide reasonable assurances that such behavior will 
not recur. 
This proposal is intentionally demanding, in part because the tendency 
of regulatory agencies generally to overprosecute95 and in part because 
of the special risks that the suspension and bar sanction will be 
overutilized96 Thus, it specifically incorporates a "least restrictive 
means" provision, which will encourage the Commission to utilize 
shorter term suspensions rather than lifetime bars. It also specifically 
authorizes a process by which the bar may be lifted after a reasonable 
period of time. Without such a process, and a congressional signal that 
such a process is necessary, the Commission might well continue its 
practice of refusing to lift a bar even when the offender's circumstances 
and behavior have materially changed.97 
95. See Clifton Leaf, Enough Is Enough, FORTUNE, Mar. 18, 2002, at 60, 68 (noting 
that in the ten years from 1992 to 200 I, the SEC referred 609 cases to the Justice Department 
for possible criminal prosecution, over sixty-four percent of which the Justice Department 
declined to prosecute). 
96. See Barnard, supra note 14, at 1520 (noting that "selective incapacitation 
schemes, such as that presented by the Remedies Act, inevitably result in courts sanctioning 
defendants for whom incapacitation is unnecessary ('false positives') far more often than 
they fail to sanction defendants for whom incapacitation is appropriate ('false negatives')"). 
97. See SEC v. Coldicutt, 258 F.3d 939, 945 (9th Cir. 2001) (reflecting the 
Commission's resistance to offender's claim that after nine years of compliance with an 
injunction it should be vacated because ''the stigma of the injunction cause[d] her 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In enacting the Remedies Act, Congress obviously made a 
considered determination that, in the case of securities law offenders, a 
lifelong bar may be necessary in some cases to protect investors. It 
therefore authorized the comprehensive bar as a judicial option. 
Congress also, however, set the standard for entering such an order 
quite high when it required courts to make a fmding of substantial 
unfitness. This decision took into account the many mechanisms by 
which corporate officers and directors are selected, monitored, 
incentivized, criticized, assessed by the press, evaluated by their peers, 
and challenged by the market. It also recognized that, even where 
securities laws offenders are not barred by court order from serving, 
they will seldom receive offers to serve as public company officers or 
directors. And in those few circumstances where an offender is invited 
to serve as an officer or director, (1) the details of her crimes will have 
to be disclosed to all parties, (2) institutional investors will be watching 
her closely, and (3) regulatory agencies like the SEC will have their 
eyes peeled and their knives sharpened in the event of future 
misconduct. 
Congress, in short, believed that suspension and bar orders 
should be rare, that they should depend upon clear and convincing 
factual evidence of a likelihood of future harm to the public, and that 
the federal courts, rather than the SEC, were best suited to make the 
necessary fmdings of fact. Congress was right in these assumptions, 
and nothing in the twelve years since passage of the Remedies Act 
suggests otherwise. 
Congress should now resist the efforts of the SEC to amend the 
Remedies Act. It should decline to grant the SEC the authority to bar 
and suspend offenders from serving as corporate officers and 
directors. Instead it should turn its energies to other kinds of reforms 
that will strengthen the SEC's hand where it matters. 
embarrassment and distress, and that there [was] little likelihood she [would] again become 
active as a securities broker or be involved in the securities business''). 
